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Abstract
This article sustains that the so-called ‘post-truth’ phenomenon also depends on 
the characteristics of the new ‘hybrid’ communicative scenario. The thesis is that this 
new scenario is substantially different from that of the ‘party democracy’, protagonist 
of significant part of the twentieth century, and from that of the ‘audience democracy’, 
defined by Bernard Manin in the mid-nineties. The emergence of new media entails a 
series of consequences, including the fragmentation of the audience into a plurality of 
self-referential segments, politically polarized ‘bubbles’, devoid, at least potentially, of 
a common communicative sphere. Taking into account such developments, the article 
seeks to construct the ‘ideal type’ of a ‘bubble democracy’, marked by the mistrust of 
institutions, fragmentation of the audience, disintermediation, homophilic tendencies, 
and polarization.
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Resumen
Este artículo sostiene que el así llamado fenómeno de la “posverdad” también de-
pende de las características del nuevo sistema de comunicación “híbrido”. La tesis es 
que este nuevo escenario es sustancialmente diferente a lo de la “democracia partidária”, 
protagonista de una parte significativa del siglo XX, y de la “democracia de audiencias”, 
definida por Bernard Manin a mediados de los noventa. La aparición de nuevos medios 
de comunicación tiene una serie de consecuencias, entre ellas la fragmentación de la 
audiencia en una pluralidad de segmentos auto-referenciales, “burbujas” políticamente 
polarizadas, desprovistas, por lo menos potencialmente, de una esfera comunicativa 
común. Teniendo en cuenta estos desarrollos, el artículo trata de construir el “tipo ideal” 
de “democracia de burbujas”, marcada por la desconfianza de las instituciones, fragmen-
tación de la audiencia, desintermediación, tendencia a la homofilia, y la polarización.
Palabras clave
Democracia de partido; Democracia de audiencias; Política de la posverdad; 
Eco-cámaras; Filtro de Burbuja; Polarización; Medios de comunicación y Democracia.
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The ultimate truth
In many of his novels, Philip K. Dick stages an intricate maze of plots and manipula-
tions that leave his reader quite disoriented. Once such novel is The Penultimate Truth, 
published in 1964, in which Dick imagines, in an unspecified future, that a nuclear war 
between Western democracies and Asian communist regimes has forced most of the 
planet’s population to take refuge in large underground tunnels, or ‘ant tanks’, where the 
main activity is the production of androids to fight the war on the earth’s surface, now 
contaminated by radiation. Via television screens, daily messages from the American 
president reach the population motivating it to support the war effort and updating it 
with news of the conflict. However, the reader gradually discovers, page after page, that 
the entire economic and political system is based on the systematic falsification of reali-
ty. The war has, indeed, ended many years ago, with the two political blocks eventually 
reconciling, the soil only partially contaminated, and the androids used as servants in 
the luxurious villas of the ruling class. The images of war transmitted by television are 
only fiction, just as the supposedly ongoing war between East and West is a lie. Even Tal-
bot Yance, the United States president who appeals to the underground workers every 
day, urging them to work harder, is simply a mechanical puppet, reciting scripts crafted 
by professional writers.
Over the last few years, in our own world, the spectre of systematic lies has likewise 
cast its shadow over the political stage. From 2016, following the double shock of the 
outcome of the Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s electoral victory, many obser-
vers have argued that one of the greatest dangers for Western democracies comes from 
‘fake news’, ‘post-truth’, or the systematic falsification of reality, to which certain ‘an-
ti-establishment’ political forces resort. To explain the fortune of today’s ‘populisms’, 
many hypotheses have been formulated, including references to socio-economic factors 
and cultural components of the ‘revolt against liberalism’(Palano, 2017, 2018, 2019a). 
However, in a non-episodic way, the discussion has turned to the irrationality of ‘digital 
swarms’, to their indifference in the face of rational arguments, to their inability to dis-
tinguish between truth and lies. In this scenario, the concept of ‘post-truth’ has become 
an almost constant reference in many reflections on the impact of the abundance of lies 
circulating on the Web, on processes of polarization, on mechanisms of manipulation 
of public opinion, and on strategies of disinformation used by emerging authoritarian 
regimes.
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In considering the relationship between ‘politics’ and ‘truth’, the discussion on the 
so-called ‘post-truth’ phenomenon proposes arguments and themes extensively explo-
red since the very origins of Western political philosophy. However, due to the reference 
to ‘truth’, the discussion often centres on a terrain in which different conceptions of 
politics and the relationship between politics and values  are opposed rather than diffe-
rent interpretations of contemporary political transformations. In many ways, indeed, 
the manipulation of reality is a tool that politics has always used, since politics is also 
the product of a clash of antagonistic representations of reality (Jay, 2010). Naturally, 
there are notable differences between the propaganda of an authoritarian regime and 
the propaganda of a party that simply operates within a competitive scenario, but, most 
probably, the concept of ‘truth’, due to its specific implications, risks being an overly 
problematic reference for making distinctions between different degrees of information 
manipulation. Also for this reason, the theme of ‘post-truth’ will be approached, in the 
following pages, from a ‘minimalist’ perspective, which relativizes the ‘revolutionary’ 
role of social media, while recognizing that such tools have substantially changed the 
communicative scenario.
Rather than establishing whether the contemporary citizen is less critical today than 
in the past, or hypothesizing why public opinion is currently more exposed to the se-
duction of ‘post-truth’, this article focuses on connections between the new communi-
cation scenario and the functioning of contemporary democratic regimes. The thesis 
at the centre of the following pages is, indeed, that the new scenario, and, in particular, 
the widespread use of social media, favour very different dynamics, not only from those 
of the old ‘party democracy’, protagonist of a significant part of the twentieth century, 
but also from those of the ‘audience democracy’, whose distinctive features were iden-
tified by Bernard Manin almost a quarter of a century ago. However, the novelty does 
not consist in the fact that today’s political actors manipulate reality, because, even in 
the past, mass ideological parties, and television itself, proposed particularly partisan 
visions of reality, sometimes resorting to marked manipulations of information. In this 
sense, therefore, it is naive to think that the use of ‘fake news’ is a novelty introduced by 
Donald Trump, or by agencies through which Russia exerts its ‘sharp power’. The novel-
ty must be sought rather not only in the ‘content’ manipulated by ‘fake news’, but also in 
the communicative and social context in which the ‘fake news’ is used and in the decline 
in the monopoly of ‘regimes of truth’ provoked by the processes of disintermediation. 
Indeed, the spread of social media triggers a fragmentation of the ‘audience’ into a plu-
rality of segments that tend to be rooted in a common communicative sphere and the 
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formation of a myriad of ‘bubbles’, largely self-referential and potentially polarized. In 
this context, the so-called ‘post-truth’ phenomenon assumes a political relevance.
Taking into account the transformations in the communicative scenario, this article 
aims to build a new ‘ideal type’ of democracy, the ‘bubble democracy’, an alternative to 
‘party democracy’ and ‘audience democracy’. This new ‘ideal type’ takes into account, in 
particular, the relations between citizens, information and parties that establish them-
selves in the context of disintermediation. The essay does not aim, however, to argue 
that, today, we are already in a ‘bubble democracy’, or to suggest that Western political 
systems are necessarily oriented in this direction, but simply to elaborate a theoretical 
model that can help us to interpret emerging contemporary changes (Palano, 2019b, 
2019c, forthcoming).
The rise and fall of ‘audience democracy’
Philip K. Dick’s novels were the fruit of fifties and sixties’ America, of the cold war, 
of the emergence of the ‘opulent society’, of the spectacularization of politics under 
the presidency of Eisenhower and, particularly, John F. Kennedy, but, above all, of the 
centrality that television assumed in society in the period following the end of the 
Second World War. Among others, Dick had well understood that the introduction 
of television into the homes of Americans was irreversibly changing the logics of pol-
itics, since leaders could finally do without newspapers, party apparatuses and local 
intermediaries, to directly address individual citizens. While adopting the instrument 
of genre fiction, and projecting the story into the distant future, Dick proposed the 
same image of democracy that, in those years, had emerged from the analyzes of 
Charles Wright Mills, and from the complaints of Vance Packard regarding the role 
of ‘hidden persuaders’. The most significant elements of the denunciation hidden in 
Dick’s novels were most probably not in the simple idea that a sort of compact elite 
dominated the political scene, but rather in the fact that such domination resorted to 
a systematic deformation of reality, and that, accordingly, the façade of informative 
pluralism concealed the well-oiled machinery of an efficient propaganda apparatus. 
In this regard, Western democracy might not be so far removed from so-called totali-
tarian regimes, and the face of the mechanical simulacrum of Talbot Yance might not 
be so very different from George Orwell’s representation of ‘Big Brother’. However, 
the type of subject addressed by The Penultimate Truth’s communicative machine is 
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the television ‘audience’, a ‘public’ distinct from that of the ‘masses’ controlled by ‘Big 
Brother’.
Although Gustave Le Bon had announced the advent of the ‘age of crowds’ in 1895, 
the twentieth century was above all the era of the ‘masses’ and of the ‘public’. With 
some simplification, one might also recognize a progressive shift, during the twentieth 
century, from the ‘masses’ to the ‘public’, an extreme example of which, in The Penulti-
mate Truth, being that of the passive population of workers crowded in ‘ant tanks’ and 
anesthetized by television propaganda. Already in the 1960s, while Dick was developing 
his criticism of American democracy, some acute observers were beginning to argue 
that communicative transformations, together with changes in society, and the advent 
of economic well-being, were altering relations between citizens and politics. The main 
victim of such processes was, in many ways, the main organizer of the ‘masses’, that is 
the political party, Antonio Gramsci’s ‘Modern Prince’, or the ‘machine for producing 
passions’, as Simone Weil, in a way that was anything but benevolent, had called it. This 
is how Otto Kirchheimer saw it, for example, in the new ‘catch-all party’ within the 
context of the rapid metamorphosis of German social democracy (Kirchheimer, 1966). 
Beyond the specific circumstances that had fuelled such reflections, the starting point of 
the reasoning was the new political centrality of what was, for Gabriel Tarde, the ‘public’, 
an audience of individuals who, though physically separated, are exposed to the same 
communications flow, and to the same ‘image’ of the real world (Tarde, 1901). From a 
strictly political point of view, much more than in a context dominated by print media, 
the new television medium allowed aspiring leaders to ‘directly’ address voters, without 
having to use the party’s traditional communication tools, such as newspapers, flyers, 
rallies, proselytism, and so on. The communications apparatuses of the parties of the 
masses thus started to become obsolete, since they intercepted not the ‘public’, but only 
members and sympathizers, that is, those ‘separate worlds’ which were already showing 
signs of disaggregation.
Naturally, the establishment of the ‘public’ was anything but rapid. From a histor-
ical point of view, the resistance of the ‘mass’, or, better, of the ‘masses’, to social, po-
litical and communicative transformations turned out to be anything but episodic. In 
any case, the rise of the ‘public’ was much slower in Europe than in the United States, 
and experienced a significant turning point only in the 1980s and 1990s, coinciding 
with the growth in commercial television and the end of the Cold War, a political 
period which seemed to ‘unfreeze’ itself, freeing up voters from party identification. 
In the mid-nineties, it was Bernard Manin, in particular, who re-contemplated the 
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logic of transformation taking place, arguing that a new ‘audience democracy’ was 
now replacing the old ‘party democracy’. In the conclusion of his ‘Principles of Rep-
resentative Government’, Manin also dwelt on the ‘metamorphosis’ that representa-
tive government had undergone in little over a century. The starting point, in such a 
discussion, was the disappearance of the relationship of identification that in the past 
bound citizens to parties. On the basis of such news, Manin proposed three ‘ideal 
types’: ‘parliamentarism’, ‘party democracy’, and ‘audience democracy’. Each of these 
constructs, which differed in the type of trust relationship, the autonomy of represen-
tatives, the freedom of public opinion, and the fora of public discussion, identified 
three stages affected by the metamorphosis of representative government from the 
end of the nineteenth century (Manin, 1997). 
In the first ‘ideal type’ identified by Manin, ‘parliamentarianism’, the trust relation-
ship has a predominantly personal character, the elected deputy enjoys substantial 
autonomy in his political conduct, public opinion manifests itself in channels that 
are structurally independent of representative parties and institutions, and public 
discussion among political parties takes place mainly in the parliamentary theatre 
(Manin, 1995). In ‘party democracy’, the second construct identified by the French 
scholar, the mechanisms of representation are rather significantly different. First of 
all, the choice of the individual citizen is no longer expressed by virtue of a rela-
tionship of personal trust, but only as a result of the trust placed in a given party, 
in the ideology or sub-cultural identity of which it is bearer. At the same time, it is 
the party organization that selects candidates, making its choices mainly within its 
own internal bureaucracy. The autonomy of action of the elected representative is 
strongly limited by the directives of party leaders. Public opinion appears to be struc-
tured in terms of a substantial parallelism with respect to the political framework, 
in the sense that the system is able to ‘encapsulate’ the voices reaching it from soci-
ety. Public discussion takes place mainly between parties, or within parties, though 
outside of the representative assemblies. The distinctive trait of the ‘party democ-
racy’, in any case, lies, above all, in the stability of electoral choices, which are al-
most entirely impervious to short-term considerations. On the other hand, in the 
‘audience democracy’, the third ‘ideal type’ proposed by Manin, electoral choices re-
turn to being volatile, since they can change from one election to the next, as trust is 
mainly directed at candidates, and not at parties. The main drive behind the trans-
formation, beyond changes in the economic and social context, is attributable, ac-
cording to the French scholar, to the role of radio and television, which allow for 
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a ‘direct’ relationship between leaders and citizens. According to the new construct 
proposed by Manin, voters tend to resemble the audience of a show only allowed to 
react with either approval or dissent. For this reason, in the ‘audience democracy’, 
alternative leaderships face one another on the electoral stage by putting forward pro-
posals aimed at triggering reactions in voters, just like in the theatre, where actors, 
in more or less successful performances, aim to achieve the resounding applause of 
an audience that is, in any case, quite separated from them by the lights of the stage. 
In this new political phase, political identities tend to dissolve, and ‘the electorate 
appears, above all, to have an attitude which responds to the terms that have been 
presented on the political stage’ (Manin, 1997, p. 223). Given that the parties no lon-
ger have any organizational or identity connection with society, convergence with the 
public therefore appears as the result of a constant process of interaction.
Despite certain limitations in this perspective, the ‘audience democracy’ formula 
allows us to understand a rather significant aspect. The centrality of the ‘audience’ did 
not, indeed, simply imply a consistent push towards ‘personalization’, but also a ten-
dential convergence to the centre-ground of the main political actors, which, in any 
case, arose as a logical consequence of the centrality of television in the political game. 
The affirmation of such a great generalist media as TV, together with the weakening 
of party identifications, which ‘liberated’ votes from ideological conditioning, made 
it almost inevitable that the leaders of the big parties sought electoral victory in the 
‘centre’. It was therefore a given that the battle should be concentrated on an attempt to 
win over the voter from a central position between the two extremes of left and right. 
Precisely for this reason, as Kirchheimer had already foreseen, the big parties, unable 
to settle for their own pool of faithful and militant voters, then had to moderate their 
ideological appeal, attenuate the radical nature of their messages, and soften the in-
tensity of their flag-waving.
The ‘audience democracy’ did not, however, materialize in all European political 
systems, and, today, this ‘ideal type’ manages to apply to very little of the dynamics 
affecting Western democratic systems. The drive towards personalization has not, in 
any case, been exhausted, the crisis of confidence in the political class and parties has 
not been stopped, and, indeed, disaffection has continued to grow, with all such factors 
being combined in a new communicative logic, which produces rather different conse-
quences.
SOFT-Taco #12.indd   44 28/05/20   12:11
45
Towards a ‘bubble democracy’?
While the construct of the ‘audience democracy’, despite its limitations, has man-
aged to explain a significant number of the novelties of a political season, today, it has 
become clear that such a season has most probably ended. Starting from 2008, the year 
in which the financial crisis took on a global dimension, in which Barack Obama was 
elected to the White House, and at a point when social media began to modify the 
political campaign logic, the emergence of radical formations and of leaders usually 
defined as ‘populists’ has been seen in almost all Western political systems, to an extent 
much greater than in the previous sixty years, while polarization has started to become a 
constant in political confrontation. To explain this change, various structural dynamics 
can be called upon, including geopolitical changes, the economic crisis, the framework 
of the EU and the demographic profile of Western countries, but one cannot ignore that 
certain aspects have more to do with the new communicative scenario. The season of 
‘audience democracy’, if at some point it existed, has most probably ended because, due 
also to the progressive affirmation of the Web as the main information channel, the en-
vironment in which citizens form their opinions and express their identities has begun 
to change. Thus, the same ‘audience’ is broken down into a myriad of bubbles, or into 
the ephemeral structure of the swarm.
Naturally, all these transformations, which began, in fact, only a few years ago, are 
still far from totally transforming the previous scenario. Therefore, it is naive to think 
that there is no longer any trace to be found of the ‘party democracy’ or the ‘audience 
democracy’. However, while it is probably not yet the case to definitively abandon such 
interpretative categories, it is, in any case, necessary to elaborate formulas to take into 
account the elements of radical novelty that have emerged. It is precisely with such a 
goal in mind that one can try to define the emergence of an alternative construct to 
those of the ‘party democracy’ and the ‘audience democracy’ in a new ‘ideal type’ provi-
sionally defined as the ‘bubble democracy’, due to the importance of ‘bubbles’ in which 
the generalist audience is fragmented, and by virtue of the self-referential tendency that 
tends to mark the segments into which the ‘audience’ is divided. Of course, as always 
happens with the construction of ‘ideal types’, in accordance with Max Weber’s school 
of thought, the features of the ‘bubble democracy’ are built through the ‘extremization’ 
of certain recognizably real facts, with the aim of emphasizing a trend and understand-
ing its implications. Therefore, the contours of the ‘bubble democracy’ must not be 
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interpreted as a faithful representation of what western democracies are today, nor as a 
deterministic forecast of changes in voting behaviour, of choices of media consumption, 
or of the crisis in traditional media and generalist TV. The utility of this new construct 
is rather in understanding to what extent today’s Western political systems relate to the 
models of the ‘party democracy’ and the ‘audience democracy’, or rather to this new 
‘bubble democracy’.
In outlining the ‘bubble democracy’, a first element may be identified in a distrust 
of the political class. This element is not necessarily in contrast with the construct of 
the ‘audience democracy’, even though its implications gravitate in a rather different 
direction. In all Western democracies, many indicators return the picture of an in-
creasingly weak legitimacy of the parties and their political class (Dalton & Weldon, 
2007). Various observers have also signalled the emergence, especially in the United 
States, of a singular convergence between electoral volatility and a high degree of 
polarization. This convergence, while apparently rather paradoxical, can, however, 
be partly explained by referencing the new communicative scenario (Pew Research 
Center, 2014; Campbell, 2018).
A second significant piece of the ‘bubble democracy’ puzzle comes from the re-
duction in the costs of disseminating information. As Yascha Mounk has pointed out, 
among others, the advent of the Internet has indeed changed the dynamics of the dis-
tribution of news, lowering the costs of disseminating information and points of view, 
while social media have further brought down barriers, allowing virtually anyone to 
form a position on any matter. Despite some forcing, Mounk’s thesis captures an impor-
tant aspect. As a result of disintermediation, the technological advantage once available 
to political elites, in pluralistic and competitive contexts, as much as in authoritarian 
contexts, has, at least in part, been eroded, and outsiders have thus gained access to hi-
therto inaccessible opportunities, both in African regions with problematic statehoods 
and in mature democracies in which institutions maintain a solid control of their terri-
tories (Mounk, 2018; Pierskalla &Hollenbach, 2012).
While the aspect reported by Mounk is undoubtedly significant, another comes 
from the fragmentation of the ‘audience’ caused by structural changes in the offer of 
communications, and by individual strategies for managing ‘information overload’. Re-
garding the first cause, over ten years ago, several scholars had already indicated that 
the decline in generalist television announced the emergence of a new situation, very 
different from that which had marked Western democracies over the preceding forty 
years (Prior, 2017). However, the overall picture clearly had to be changed, in particular, 
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due to the irrepressible entry of social media into the logic of communications. Natu-
rally, these changes have not yet obscured the role of the generalist TV, but certainly 
they have begun to significantly modify the scenario, since, in a ‘hybrid’ context, the 
same contents of generalist TV are ‘fragmented’ and used in media with an altogether 
different logic.
Another element connected to ‘fragmentation’ is the predictive ‘profiling’ technolo-
gy used by platforms. In 2011, Eli Pariser, a pioneer of online activism and endorser of 
Barack Obama’s first electoral campaign, promptly foresaw the implications of what was 
happening on the Web, as a result of the personalization of user searches introduced by 
Google on 4th December 2009 (Pariser, 2011). Put simply, from that moment on, the 
Page Rank search algorithm began to return results calculated to be better suited to the 
individual user, inaugurating the new ‘era of personalization’ of the Web. In his 2011 es-
say, Pariser was not drawing his readers’ attention to the privacy risks that the ‘persona-
lization’ of searches entailed, but rather to the risk of a disaggregation of the ‘audience’. 
Indeed, algorithms do not merely predict individual choices, but tend to create around 
each user what Pariser called a ‘filter bubble’, that allows only the penetration of infor-
mation from the outside world in line with the previous choices made by the individual 
user, and therefore only conforming to his or her already formed opinions, orientations 
and political ideas. Pariser observed that each of us, for this reason, tends to live ever 
increasingly inside a ‘bubble’, in which we see a ‘personalized’ world that is constructed, 
so to speak, in our own image and likeness. Everything that does not conform to our 
orientations, and, more properly, our past choices, simply ends up disappearing from 
view, held back by the filter surrounding our personal bubbles. 
However convincing it may seem, the thesis of the pervasiveness of the filter bub-
ble is problematic to prove empirically (Hannak et al., 2013; Dillhaut, Brooks, Gulati, 
2015). To escape such intractability, other scholars have developed a different, although 
not entirely alternative, hypothesis, which focuses on the conscious choices of indivi-
dual users, and which helps to identify a further element in the ‘bubble democracy’, the 
tendency to homophily in communicative exchanges. According to the hypothesis of 
the ‘echo chamber’, it is not the algorithms that, without our knowledge, lock us into a 
‘bubble’, but that we ourselves do it, through our daily choices in terms of media con-
sumption. The algorithms, if anything, are limited to reinforcing mechanisms adopted 
spontaneously by network users, and, therefore, each and every one of us builds his or 
her own ‘bubble’, because each individual, at least in terms of social media exchanges, 
tends to interact mainly, and more frequently, with those who have similar opinions, 
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reducing to a minimum exchange with those who think differently. Then, by turning 
to sources ever closer to our own opinions, or interacting with ‘friends’ that share our 
own preferences, we enclose ourselves more and more every day in an echo chamber in 
which the same watchwords continuously rebound off its walls (Iyengar, Sood, Lelkes 
2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). From this point of view, the proliferation of ‘bubbles’ 
therefore constitutes a sort of ‘tribalization’ (Bartlett, 2018; see also: Bakshy, Messing, 
Adamic, 2015; Bessi et al., 2015a, 2015b; Anagnostopoulos et al., 2016; Del Vicario et 
al., 2016, 2017). 
A further element defining the ‘bubble democracy’ concerns trust networks and the 
two crucial issues of ‘disintermediation’ and ‘post-truth’. In the discussion evolving over 
the past few years in relation to the phenomenon of ‘post-truth’, it has often been em-
phasized that the most glaring novelty introduced by social media, and, in particular, 
the falling costs of the production and distribution of opinions and news, has been the 
crisis of scientific and political authority. In other words, unlike in the past, everyone fe-
els entitled to offer a vision of the world that proposes and claims to be ‘real’, without any 
‘institutional’ legitimacy being deemed necessary, or without any intervening mediation 
by institutionalized ‘truth agencies’. In this regard, disintermediation is made ‘techni-
cally’ possible through the multiplication of information sources, while the reduction 
in opinion production and distribution costs shortens the distance between ‘high’ and 
‘low’ opinions. The result is that disintermediation places the opinions of experts and 
‘amateurs on the same level. Thus, any individual can aspire to present him or herself 
as an ‘agency of truth’. However, while trust in institutions, and in established ‘truth 
agencies’ is weakened, it does not lead to the overall erosion of trust. Rather, as happens 
precisely in the echo chambers, trust is distributed ‘horizontally’, in the sense that news 
reported by a ‘friend’ may be considered ‘more trustworthy’ than that reported by an 
authoritative source, whose trustworthiness is guaranteed by institutional mechanisms 
(Lorusso, 2018). If ‘post-truth’ is indeed tied to the individual’s perception of the trus-
tworthiness of information sources, a significant element of the ‘bubble democracy’ is 
then the passage from a scenario in which trust is placed in institutional agencies to a 
scenario in which bonds of trust are more predominantly ‘horizontal’ or ‘distributed’, 
whether entirely ‘disintermediated’ or not.
Finally, a large piece in the ‘bubble democracy’ puzzle concerns the tendency to 
polarization, and, therefore, susceptibility to centrifugal forces. Unlike in the ‘au-
dience democracy’ outlined by Manin, in the ‘bubble democracy’, the ‘audience’ is 
fragmented into a series of distinct segments, each of which is the addressed by an 
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information flow oriented to be ‘partisan’, precisely because political leaders turn to 
specific niches with the goal not of ‘convincing’ voters with moderate arguments, but 
rather of mobilizing them to vote by focusing on more rooted identities and radi-
cal issues capable of feeding into or exploiting the polarization mechanisms in echo 
chambers. In delineating the ‘ideal type’ of the ‘bubble democracy’, one can, indeed, 
already recognize today how, the increase in mistrust of parties, institutions and po-
litical classes and the ‘fragmentation’ of the ‘audience’ is accompanied, almost as a 
logical consequence, by a marked tendency to political polarization, and, more gene-
rally, to the radicalization of positions. Whether voluntary or not, the formation of 
closed bubbles seems destined to favour a process of increasing polarization. Several 
observers have, indeed, pointed out that not only are the bubbles self-referential, but 
they also tend to express extreme positions, and often wilfully disregard the degree 
of veracity of the information and any opportunities to verify that it has any basis in 
real facts. This aspect was highlighted, above all, by Cass R. Sunstein, who has long 
focused on the negative consequences, for public debate, of mechanisms driving the 
‘polarization’ of groups (Sunstein, 2002; Schkade & Sunstein, 2007). Indeed, Sunstein 
has developed a sort of ‘law of polarization’, according to which, ‘after deliberation, 
people are likely to move toward a more extreme point in the direction to which the 
group’s members were originally inclined’ (Sunstein, 2017, p. 68).
Of course, this view of polarization is closely connected with the hypothesis that so-
cial media favours homophily. Although several research studies confirm the idea that 
the homophily of users tends to restrict spaces for debate to individuals who share the 
same positions, opinions on the matter are not at all unanimous. Indeed, there are also 
scholars who dispute that ‘ideological bubbles’ exist, or that they have any role in orien-
ting voting behaviours. The discussion is set to continue over the coming years, also sin-
ce the relevance of ‘filter bubbles’ or ‘echo chambers’ should theoretically increase with, 
as many observers predict, the Web becoming effectively the predominant channel for 
accessing information for the majority of citizens. It is precisely these developments 
that will make it possible to assess more adequately the hypothesis that the loss of the 
‘audience’ creates centrifugal forces in political competition, and, with communication 
and information flows no longer passing, or predominantly not passing, through the 
large-scale generalist media, that, for political actors, it will become indispensable to 
enter the ‘tribal’ networks in which ‘bubbles’ are aggregated, and to exploit the move-
ments of ‘digital swarms’. 
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Conclusion
This article does not propose an interpretation of the ‘crisis’ that seems to be af-
fecting Western democracies, or of the roots of the ‘democratic recession’ that has 
emerged globally. Rather than within the constructs of old ‘party democracy’ and 
‘audience democracy’, described by Bernard Manin, it has rather attempted to col-
locate the recent changes in the unprecedented political and communicative scenario 
of the ‘bubble democracy’. As we have seen, the ‘bubble democracy’ should not be 
understood as a faithful representation of the reality, since it is simply an ‘ideal type’ 
constructed by extremizing certain observations in contemporary politics. It would 
therefore be naive to claim to recognize, in reality, a manifestation of the ‘pure type’. 
Indeed, the utility of ‘ideal types’, as, for example, in the case of models such as ‘feudal-
ism’ or ‘charismatic legitimacy’, consists in their capacity to offer up instruments for 
interpreting changes. Therefore, rather than ‘predicting’ future changes, the concept 
of the ‘bubble democracy’ can perhaps help to recognize a new logic already brought 
about by certain ‘structural’ modifications to relations between citizens, information 
and the political system. Clearly, however, it remains to be shown that our democ-
racies are approaching the model of the ‘bubble democracy’. In addition, regarding 
precisely the hypothesis that we are heading towards an unprecedented ‘bubble de-
mocracy’, we certainly cannot dismiss the objection, radical if, in many ways, taken 
for granted, that television still remains the main channel of information for many 
citizens. In other words, according to such an objection, we should recognize that the 
political spectacle still unfolds on TV, and that the fragmentation of the audience into 
self-referential bubbles is a marginal phenomenon, limited only to niches and con-
centrated in younger age groups. It is indeed an objection largely well-founded, which 
cannot be ignored, and which warns us against the determinism of reckless forecasts. 
Looking at what has happened over the last decade, however, it is also difficult to liq-
uidate forecasts that argue for a near future increasingly populated by ‘echo chambers’ 
and ‘digital swarms’. Precisely for this reason, though caution is indispensable, we 
must seriously consider the hypothesis that the ‘audience’, or ‘public’, is destined to 
disintegrate into a myriad of ‘bubbles’, and that the somewhat disturbing scenario of 
the ‘bubble democracy’ may soon become rather accurate model of reality.
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